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Abstract. In the paper, we investigate the Hoede-Bakker index - the notion which computes
the overall decisional ‘power’ of a player in a social network. It is assumed that each player has
an inclination (original decision) to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ which, due to influence of other players,
may be different from the final decision of the player. The main drawback of the Hoede-Bakker
index is that it hides the actual role of the influence function, analyzing only the final decision
in terms of success and failure. In this paper, we further investigate the Hoede-Bakker index,
proposing an improvement which fully takes into account the mutual influence among players. A
global index which distinguishes an influence degree from a ‘power’ index is analyzed. We define
weighted influence indices, in particular, a possibility influence index which takes into account any
possibility of influence, and a certainty influence index which expresses certainty of influence. We
consider different influence functions and study their properties.
Keywords: Hoede-Bakker index, weighted influence index, possibility influence index,
certainty influence index, equidistributed influence index, influence function
JEL Classification: C7, D7
1 Introduction
In cooperative game theory, a decisional power has been proposed by Hoede and Bakker
[10], and later generalized and modified by Rusinowska and de Swart [19]. One may ask a
question why it is interesting to analyze this concept, in particular, since a lot of indices
have been studied in the voting power literature (see, for instance, [1], [3] - [6], [11], [13],
[14], [16], [17], [20], also [8] for an overview). Generally speaking, the Hoede-Bakker index
computes the overall decisional ‘power’ of a player in a social network. It is assumed that
a decision of a player may be influenced by decisions of other players. Specifically, it is
considered that each player has an inclination (original decision) to say ‘yes’ (coded by
+1) or ‘no’ (coded by −1). For each possible configuration i of individual inclinations,
it is supposed that after mutual influence the actual decision Bi of all players is made.
Then, a group decision gd(Bi) is given.
The main drawback of the Hoede-Bakker index is that it hides the actual role of the
influence function B, analyzing only the final decision in terms of successes and failures.
The aim is then to provide alternative ways putting into lights the role of the influence
function B.
In the paper, we propose a general form of the index which enables the analysis of
influence among players. This index fills a gap between power indices which are classical
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in voting games (e.g. the Banzhaf index), and the Hoede-Bakker index. The general idea is
to compute a weighted number of times an individual j makes another individual k change
his decision, and more generally, the number od times a group S makes an individual
k /∈ S change his decision. Two particular ways of weighting lead to a possibility influence
index which takes into account any possibility of influence, and to a certainty influence
index which expresses certainty of influence.
When analyzing an influence among players, we come naturally to a concept of follow-
ers, where by a follower of a given player we mean the voter who always decides according
to the inclination of the player in question. In the paper, we study some properties of the
set of followers of a given coalition of players.
By proposing different influence functions B and the group decisions gd, we usually
receive different Hoede-Bakker indices. In this paper, we propose several influence func-
tions (like, in particular, a majority function, a ‘guru function’, the identity function,
and some others), and study their properties. We consider a purely influential function
of one coalition upon another coalition, and a particular case of such a function, called
the canonical pure influential function. Another related concept we study in this paper
is the kernel of an influence function, that is, the set of ‘true’ influential coalitions.
2 The Hoede-Bakker index
Let us first recapitulate the original Hoede-Bakker index as introduced in [10], and its
generalization given in [19]. The general framework is the following. We consider a social
network with the set of all players (agents, actors, voters) denoted by N = {1, ..., n}.
The players have to make a certain acceptance-rejection decision. Each player has an
inclination either to say ‘yes’ (denoted by +1) or ‘no’ (denoted by −1). An inclination
vector, denoted by i, is an n-vector consisting of ones and minus ones. Let I be the set
of all inclination vectors. It is assumed that players may influence each others, and due
to the influences in the network, the final decision of a player may be different from his
original inclination. In other words, each inclination vector i ∈ I is transformed into a
decision vector Bi, where B : I → I is the influence function. The set of all influence
functions will be denoted by B. The decision vector Bi is an n-vector consisting of ones
and minus ones and indicating the decisions made by all players. Let B(I) denote the set
of all decision vectors. Furthermore, the group decision function gd : B(I) → {+1,−1}
is introduced, having the value +1 if the group decision is ‘yes’, and the value −1 if the
group decision is ‘no’. The set of all group decision functions will be denoted by G.
Hoede and Bakker (1982) adopted the following two axioms to be satisfied by functions
B ∈ B and gd ∈ G:
AXIOM (GB-0):
∀i ∈ I [gd(B(−i)) = −gd(Bi)] (1)
AXIOM (GB-1):
∀i, i′ ∈ I [i ≤ i′ ⇒ gd(Bi) ≤ gd(Bi′)] (2)
where
i ≤ i′ ⇐⇒ {k ∈ N | ik = +1} ⊆ {k ∈ N | i′k = +1} (3)
and i < i′ means: i ≤ i′ and i 6= i′.
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Assuming both axioms (GB-0) and (GB-1) to be satisfied, the following definition has
been introduced ([10]):
Definition 1 Given B ∈ B and gd ∈ G, the decisional power index (the Hoede-Bakker
index) HB : B × G → [0, 1]n is given by
HBk(B, gd) :=
1
2n−1
∑
{i|ik=+1}
gd(Bi) for k ∈ N. (4)
In [19], a certain generalization of the Hoede-Bakker index has been proposed. Let us
notice that axiom (GB-0) may be easily violated, for instance, when there is a vetoer, or
when the ability to influence depends on the inclination of the influencing player; see [19].
In order to make the Hoede-Bakker index more applicable, one may keep axiom (GB-1),
and replace (GB-0) by two axioms (GB-2) and (GB-3) ([19]), which after adopting the
notation:
1N = (+1, ...,+1), −1N = (−1, ...,−1)
look as follows:
AXIOM (GB-2):
gd(B1N) = +1 (5)
AXIOM (GB-3):
gd(B(−1N)) = −1. (6)
Assuming all axioms (GB-1), (GB-2), and (GB-3) to be satisfied, the following definition
has been introduced ([19]):
Definition 2 Given B ∈ B and gd ∈ G, the generalized Hoede-Bakker index GHB :
B × G → [0, 1]n is given by
GHBk(B, gd) :=
1
2n
 ∑
{i|ik=+1}
gd(Bi)−
∑
{i|ik=−1}
gd(Bi)
 for k ∈ N. (7)
Of course, the axioms (GB-0) and (GB-1) imply the axioms (GB-1), (GB-2), and (GB-3).
First of all, we notice that neither in the original definition of the Hoede-Bakker
index nor in its generalization mentioned above, the functions B and gd are considered
separately. When calculating the (original or generalized) Hoede-Bakker index, only the
relation between an inclination vector i and the group decision gd(Bi) is taken into
account. If we do not separate the two functions B and gd, we may define Success,
Failure and Decisiveness of a player starting not from the final decision of the player in
question, but from his inclination (for an analysis of success and decisiveness of a player
in voting situations, see for instance [15]). Consequently, we may say that a player is
successful if his inclination coincides with the group decision. Adopting such a definition
of being successful, if all inclination vectors are equally probable, then the generalized
Hoede-Bakker index is a kind of a ‘net’ Success (see [18]), i.e., it is equal to ‘Success −
Failure = Decisiveness’, where Success, Decisiveness, and Failure of a player are defined
as a probability that the player is successful, is decisive, and fails, respectively. Moreover,
under such a definition of Success, if all inclination vectors are equally probable, then the
generalized Hoede-Bakker index coincides with the absolute Banzhaf index; see [19].
3
3 The influence indices
In order to take fully into account the mutual influence among players and to separate
the functions B and gd in the Hoede-Bakker setting, we introduce
global index = (d, φ) (8)
where d determines the influence degree and φ is the revised Hoede-Bakker index. We
will investigate these two components separately. In particular, we will impose separate
axioms on the ‘influence part’ and the ‘power part’ of the global index.
It seems reasonable to assume that if all players have the same inclination, their
decisions will coincide with their inclinations. Consequently, we adopt the following two
axioms on B ∈ B:
AXIOM (B-1):
B1N = 1N . (9)
AXIOM (B-2):
B(−1N) = −1N . (10)
When analyzing the ‘influence part’, the first question may appear how to measure a
degree of influence of a player (or a coalition) on the other voters. The answer is not
necessarily that straightforward if we can just observe the inclinations and the final
decisions of the players in a multi-player social network. Suppose the final decision of
player A is different from his inclination, but this decision coincides with the inclinations
of two other players in the network, say, agents B and C. Was voter A’s decision different
from his inclination because of the unique influence of player B, or the unique influence
of player C, or maybe A voted like this only because he faced an influence of the strong
two-party coalition? These are the questions that not always can be answered univocally
if apart from knowing the function B, we are not able to observe a ‘real act of influencing
among players’. Consequently, we introduce a family of influence indices.
3.1 The possibility influence index
Let us first introduce some notations. Let for k, j ∈ N
Ik→j := {i ∈ I | ij = −ik} (11)
I∗k→j(B) := {i ∈ Ik→j | (Bi)j = ik} = {i ∈ I | (Bi)j = ik = −ij}. (12)
Ik→j and I∗k→j(B) denote the set of all inclination vectors of potential influence of player
k on player j, and the set of all inclination vectors of observed influence of k on j under
given B ∈ B, respectively. Of course, Ik→k = I∗k→k(B) = ∅ for each k ∈ N and B ∈ B,
and |Ik→j| = 2n−1.
Definition 3 Given B ∈ B, for each k, j ∈ N , the possibility influence index of player k
on player j is defined by
d(B, k → j) := |I
∗
k→j(B)|
|Ik→j| =
|{i ∈ I | (Bi)j = ik = −ij}|
2n−1
. (13)
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d(B, k → j) measures a degree of influence player k has on player j, taking into account
any possibility of influence. Of course, for each B ∈ B and k, j ∈ N
d(B, k → j) ∈ [0, 1], d(B, k → k) = 0.
In definition (13) we do not impose an additional condition that (Bi)k = ik, by which
we allow the influencing player k to be in the same time influenced by another player.
Although voter k is able to make player j change his inclination (preliminary decision),
in the meantime player k may change his own preliminary decision as well.
Generalizing, we will also consider an influence of a coalition. Concerning conventions
of notations, cardinality of sets S, T, . . . will be denoted by the corresponding lower case
s, t, . . .. We omit braces for sets, e.g., {k,m}, N \ {j}, will be written km, N \ j, etc. We
also introduce for any ∅ 6= S ⊆ N the set
IS := {i ∈ I | ∀k, j ∈ S [ik = ij]}. (14)
We denote by iS the value ik for some k ∈ S, i ∈ IS. The following properties are
immediate.
(i) Ik = I = 2
N for all k ∈ N .
(ii) Letting I∅ := 2N , I : 2N → 22N is a strictly antitone function.
(iii) For any S, T 6= ∅: IS∩T ⊇ IS ∪ IT ⊇ IS ∩ IT ⊇ IS∪T and
IS∩T = IS ∪ IT iff ( min
K∈{S,T}
|K| = 1 or S ⊆ T or T ⊆ S) (15)
IS ∪ IT = IS ∩ IT iff ( max
K∈{S,T}
|K| = 1 or S = T ) (16)
IS ∩ IT = IS∪T iff S ∩ T 6= ∅. (17)
Proof: (iii) If |S| = 1 and S ∩ T = ∅, then IS∩T = I∅ = I = IS = IS ∪ IT .
If |S| = 1 and S ∩ T 6= ∅, then S ∩ T = S and IS∩T = IS = I = IS ∪ IT .
If S ⊆ T , then IS∩T = IS, IT ⊆ IS and IS ∪ IT = IS.
Suppose now that minK∈{S,T} |K| > 1, S 6⊆ T and T 6⊆ S. Hence, if S ∩ T = ∅, then
IS∩T = I∅ = I ⊃ IS ∪ IT . On the other hand, if S ∩ T 6= ∅, then also IS∩T ⊃ IS ∪ IT .
If |S| = |T | = 1 or S = T , then IS = IT , and hence IS ∪ IT = IS ∩ IT .
If maxK∈{S,T} |K| > 1 and S 6= T , then IS ∪ IT ⊃ IS ∩ IT .
If S ∩ T 6= ∅, then IS ∩ IT = IS∪T . On the other hand, if S ∩ T = ∅, then IS ∩ IT ⊃ IS∪T .

Let for each S ⊆ N and j ∈ N
IS→j := {i ∈ I | ij = −iS} (18)
I∗S→j(B) := {i ∈ I | (Bi)j = iS = −ij}. (19)
Of course, IS→j = I∗S→j(B) = ∅ for each j ∈ S and B ∈ B, and
|IS→j| = 2n−s.
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Definition 4 Given B ∈ B, for each S ⊆ N and j ∈ N , the possibility influence index
of coalition S on player j is defined as
d(B, S → j) := |I
∗
S→j(B)|
|IS→j| =
|{i ∈ I | (Bi)j = iS = −ij}|
2n−s
. (20)
For each S ⊆ N , j ∈ N , B ∈ B
d(B, S → j) ∈ [0, 1], and d(B, S → j) = 0 for j ∈ S.
3.2 The certainty influence index
Switching to another extreme way of calculating influence degree gives us the definitions
of the certainty influence indices.
Definition 5 Given B ∈ B, for each k, j ∈ N the certainty influence index of player k
on player j is defined as
d(B, k → j) := |{i ∈ I
∗
k→j(B) | ∀p 6= k [ip = ij]}|
2
. (21)
d(B, k → j) ∈ {0, 1
2
, 1} expresses certainty of influence, i.e., it measures a degree of a
certain influence player k has on player j. By analogy, we introduce
Definition 6 Given B ∈ B, for each S ⊆ N and j ∈ N , the certainty influence index of
coalition S on player j is given by
d(B, S → j) := |{i ∈ I
∗
S→j(B) | ∀p /∈ S [ip = ij]}|
2
. (22)
Again, for each B ∈ B, S ⊆ N , j ∈ N
d(B, j → j) = 0, d(B, S → j) = 0 for j ∈ S.
3.3 The weighted influence index
Finally, we propose a more general definition of the influence index. Let for each i ∈ I
and k ∈ N
n∗(i, k) := |{m ∈ N | im = ik}| ≥ 1 (23)
measures simply the number of players with the same inclination as player k under i.
For each k ∈ N , j ∈ N \ k, and i ∈ Ik→j, we introduce a weight αk→ji ∈ [0, 1]
of influence of player k on j under the inclination vector i. We impose a symmetry
assumption, i.e., we assume that αk→ji depends solely on n
∗(i, k). We also assume that
for each k ∈ N , j ∈ N \ k, there exists i ∈ Ik→j such that αk→ji > 0.
Definition 7 Given B ∈ B, for each k ∈ N , j ∈ N \ k, the weighted influence index of
player k on player j is defined as
dα(B, k → j) :=
∑
i∈I∗k→j(B) α
k→j
i∑
i∈Ik→j α
k→j
i
∈ [0, 1]. (24)
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The possibility and certainty influence indices are recovered as follows. For each k ∈ N ,
j ∈ N \ k and B ∈ B
d(B, k → j) = dα(B, k → j), where αk→ji = 1 for each i ∈ Ik→j (25)
d(B, k → j) = dα(B, k → j), where for each i ∈ Ik→j
αk→ji =
{
1 if ∀p 6= k [ip = ij]
0 otherwise
. (26)
From among the whole family of the influence indices, apart from the two mentioned
above, we specify another one, which we denote by d∗ and refer to as an equidistributed
influence index. Given B ∈ B, for each k ∈ N , j ∈ N \ k
d∗(B, k → j) := dα∗(B, k → j), where α∗k→ji :=
1
2n∗(i,k) − 1 for each i ∈ Ik→j. (27)
For the equidistributed influence index, we consider all cases of potential influence, i.e., for
each i ∈ Ik→j we count the number of all p-player coalitions of the set {m ∈ N | ik = im},
where p = 1, ..., n∗(i, k), which gives
n∗(i,k)∑
p=1
(
n∗(i, k)
p
)
= 2n
∗(i,k) − 1.
By analogy, we can define the weighted influence index of a coalition on a player. Let
for each S ⊆ N and i ∈ IS→j
n∗(i, S) := |{m ∈ N | ∀k ∈ S [im = ik]}| ≥ s (28)
where n∗(i, S) is the number of players with the same inclination as players of S under
i ∈ IS→j (including the players from S).
For each S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S and i ∈ IS→j, we introduce a weight αS→ji ∈ [0, 1] of
influence of coalition S on j /∈ S under the inclination vector i ∈ IS→j. As before, we
assume that for each S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S there exists i ∈ IS→j such that αS→ji > 0.
Moreover, we impose the symmetry assumption that αS→ji depends solely on n
∗(i, S), i.e.,
for each S, S ′ ⊆ N , j /∈ S, j′ /∈ S ′, i ∈ IS→j, i′ ∈ IS′→j′ ,
if n∗(i, S) = n∗(i′, S ′), then αS→ji = α
S′→j′
i′ (29)
In particular, for each S ⊂ N , j /∈ S and i ∈ IS→j,
αS→ji = α
S→j
−i . (30)
Definition 8 Given B ∈ B, for each S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S, the weighted influence index of
coalition S on player j is defined as
dα(B, S → j) :=
∑
i∈I∗S→j(B) α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
∈ [0, 1]. (31)
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The possibility and certainty influence indices are recovered as follows. For each S ⊆ N ,
j ∈ N \ S and B ∈ B
d(B, S → j) = dα(B, S → j), where αS→ji = 1 for each i ∈ IS→j (32)
d(B, S → j) = dα(B, S → j), where for each i ∈ IS→j
αS→ji =
{
1 if ∀p /∈ S [ip = ij]
0 otherwise
. (33)
As before, apart from the possibility and certainty influence indices, we specify the
equidistributed influence index. Given B ∈ B, for each S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S
d∗(B, S → j) = dα∗(B, S → j), where α∗S→ji =
1
2n∗(i,S) − 1 for each i ∈ IS→j. (34)
Definition 9 Consider a family of weighted influence indices
D(B, j) := {dα(B, S → j)}S⊆N\j,S 6=∅ (35)
on j, with weights αS→ji , i ∈ I, S ⊆ N \ j, S 6= ∅. The family D(B, j) (or equivalently the
family of their associate weights) is said to be situation invariant if for all S ⊆ N \ j, for
all i ∈ I∗S→j(B), αS→ji = αk→ji , for all k ∈ S.
Let us remark that:
(i) the possibility influence index is situation invariant, since all weights are equal to 1.
(ii) the certainty influence index is not situation invariant. Indeed, taking S = {k,m} and
i ∈ I∗km→j(B), we have necessarily ik = im = −ij. Then αk→ji = αm→ji = 0, although
αkm→ji = 1 for one such i.
(iii) the equidistributed influence index is situation invariant, since for any i ∈ I∗S→j(B),
n∗(i, S) = n∗(i, k), for all k ∈ S.
Proposition 1 Let D(B, j) be a situation invariant family of weighted influence indices
on j. Then for any S ⊆ N \ j,
∑
k∈S
dα(B, k → j) ≥
|S|∑i∈IS→j αS→ji∑
i∈Ik→j α
k→j
i
dα(B, S → j). (36)
Proof: For any k ∈ S, we have:
dα(B, k → j) =
∑
i∈I∗k→j(B) α
k→j
i∑
i∈Ik→j α
k→j
i
=
1∑
i∈Ik→j α
k→j
i
[ ∑
i∈I∗S→j(B)
αk→ji +
∑
K⊆S\k,K 6=∅
∑
{i|im=ij ,m∈K and
im=−ij=(Bi)j ,m∈S\K}
αk→ji
]
=
1∑
i∈Ik→j α
k→j
i
[ ∑
i∈I∗S→j(B)
αS→ji + 
]
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with  ≥ 0. This being true for any k ∈ S, we get:∑
k∈S
dα(B, k → j) ≥ |S|∑
i∈Ik→j α
k→j
i
∑
i∈I∗S→j(B)
αS→ji
=
|S|∑i∈IS→j αS→ji∑
i∈Ik→j α
k→j
i
dα(B, S → j).

As a particular case, we obtain for the possibility influence index:∑
k∈S
d(B, k → j) ≥ s
2s−1
d(B, S → j). (37)
Also, for S = {k,m}, this reduces to the simple subadditive relation:
d(B, k → j) + d(B,m→ j) ≥ d(B, km→ j). (38)
Example 1 Let us add a few lines more about a relation between the influence index
of a coalition and the sum of the influence indices of the members of that coalition. We
notice that there exists a coalition S with s ≥ 3 such that∑
k∈S
d(B, k → j) < d(B, S → j), (39)
and there exists a coalition S with s ≥ 3 such that∑
k∈S
d(B, k → j) > d(B, S → j). (40)
In order to show this, we consider a four-player network in which player 4 is influenced
by players 1, 2 and 3. Suppose player 4 will follow the others only if all players 1, 2 and
3 have the same inclination; otherwise he will decide according to his own inclination. In
other words, function B is defined as follows:
∀k ∈ {1, 2, 3} ∀i ∈ I [(Bi)k = ik]
(Bi)4 =
{
i1 if i1 = i2 = i3
i4 otherwise
.
Hence, we get
∀k ∈ {1, 2, 3} [ d(B, k → 4) = 1
4
]
d(B, 123→ 4) = 1 >
3∑
k=1
d(B, k → 4).
We get a similar result for an n-player network with n > 4, where player n is influenced
by all players 1, 2, ..., n − 1, and he will follow the others only if they all have the same
inclination. If we define the influence function differently, for instance as B′ such that
player 4 will always follow the majority of the influencing players, then we get
d(B′, 123→ 4) = 1 < 9
4
=
3∑
k=1
d(B′, k → 4).
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3.4 Influential null player
We introduce the following definition:
Definition 10 Player k ∈ N is said to be an influential null player under B ∈ B if
∀j ∈ N \ k ∀i ∈ Ik→j [(Bi)j = (Bi−k)j], (41)
where i−k is given by
i−km =
{
im if m 6= k
−im if m = k for each m ∈ N. (42)
Fact 1 If (B-1), (B-2) are satisfied and k ∈ N is an influential null player under B ∈ B,
then
∀j ∈ N [d(B, k → j) = 0]. (43)
Proof: Let k ∈ N be an influential null player under B ∈ B and let j ∈ N \ k. Let
i ∈ Ik→j be such that +1 = ik = −ij = −ip for each p 6= k, and let i′ ∈ Ik→j be such that
−1 = i′k = −i′j = −i′p for each p 6= k. Hence, by virtue of axioms (B-1), (B-2), and (41),
(Bi)j = (Bi
−k)j = (B(−1N))j = −1 = −ik
(Bi′)j = (Bi′−k)j = (B1N)j = +1 = −i′k
Hence, d(B, k → j) = 0. 
Let us consider the following monotonicity condition:
∀i, i′ ∈ I [i ≤ i′ ⇒ Bi ≤ Bi′] (44)
where
Bi ≤ Bi′ ⇐⇒ {k ∈ N | (Bi)k = +1} ⊆ {k ∈ N | (Bi′)k = +1}. (45)
This condition will be violated, for instance, if there is a kind of ‘opposite influence’ (‘My
vote is (always) different from your inclination’). Nevertheless, one may suppose that in
many situations the condition (44) holds.
Fact 2 If k˜ ∈ N is an influential null player under B ∈ B, and condition (44) is satisfied,
then for each j ∈ N
k˜ = arg min
k∈N\j
dα(B, k → j) (46)
Proof: Let k˜ ∈ N be an influential null player under B ∈ B, and j ∈ N \ k˜. Let us
consider an arbitrary k ∈ N \ {k˜, j}. Note that to each i ∈ Ik˜→j corresponds a unique
i′ ∈ Ik→j such that
i′k = ik˜, i
′
k˜
= ik, i
′
m = im for each m ∈ N \ {k˜, k}, (47)
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and reciprocally. Hence, by virtue of (29), for these i ∈ Ik˜→j and i′ ∈ Ik→j satisfying (47),
αk˜→ji = α
k→j
i′ ,
and therefore, ∑
i∈I
k˜→j
αk˜→ji =
∑
i∈Ik→j
αk→ji .
Suppose k is also an influential null player under B ∈ B. For i ∈ Ik˜→j and i′ ∈ Ik→j
satisfying (47), if i 6= i′ (that is, if ik˜ = −ik), then
(Bi)j = (Bi
−k˜)j = (Bi′−k)j = (Bi′)j,
and therefore (Bi)j = (Bi
′)j, which leads us to the conclusion that
either (i ∈ I∗
k˜→j(B) and i
′ ∈ I∗k→j(B)) or (i /∈ I∗k˜→j(B) and i′ /∈ I∗k→j(B)).
Since additionally αk˜→ji = α
k→j
i′ , we get
dα(B, k˜ → j) =
∑
i∈I∗
k˜→j(B)
αk˜→ji∑
i∈I
k˜→j
αk˜→ji
=
∑
i∈I∗k→j(B) α
k→j
i∑
i∈Ik→j α
k→j
i
= dα(B, k → j).
Suppose k is not an influential null player under B ∈ B. For i ∈ Ik˜→j and i′ ∈ Ik→j
satisfying (47), if i 6= i′ (that is, if ik˜ = −ik) and (Bi′)j 6= (Bi′−k)j, then from (44) we
have
−ij = ik˜ = i′k = −i′j = (Bi′)j = −(Bi′−k)j = −(Bi)j,
which means that (i /∈ I∗
k˜→j(B) and i
′ ∈ I∗k→j(B)). Hence, summarizing,
dα(B, k˜ → j) ≤ dα(B, k → j).

4 The influence functions
Let us study some properties of the influence functions B ∈ B. Before we focus of the
influence functions, we remark properties of some related concepts.
Definition 11 Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and B ∈ B. The set of followers of S under B is defined
as
FB(S) := {j ∈ N | ∀i ∈ IS [(Bi)j = iS]}. (48)
The set of anti-followers of S under B is defined as
FB(S) := {j ∈ N | ∀i ∈ IS [(Bi)j = −iS]}. (49)
Letting FB(∅) := ∅, FB is a mapping from 2N to 2N .
In general FB(S) 6⊇ S, although this would be a desirable property in general. If in
addition FB(FB(S)) = FB(S) holds (not true in general), then FB is a closure operator.
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Definition 12 An influence function B ∈ B is said to be strong if FB(S) ⊇ S for each
S ⊆ N .
Proposition 2 Let B ∈ B. Then the following holds:
(i) Whenever S ∩ T = ∅, FB(S) ∩ FB(T ) = ∅.
(ii) FB is an isotone function. Consequently, if FB(N) = ∅, then FB ≡ ∅.
(iii) FB(N) = N iff both axioms (B-1) and (B-2) are satisfied.
(iv) If B is strong, then both axioms (B-1) and (B-2) are satisfied.
(v) For each j˜ ∈ FB(S) \ S, dα(B, S → j˜) = 1.
Proof: (i) Since S ∩ T = ∅, IS ∩ IT strictly includes IS∪T . Then there exist i ∈ IS ∩ IT
such that iS = −iT . Hence if j ∈ FB(S) ∩ FB(T ) the equality (Bi)j = iS = iT cannot
hold for this i.
(ii) Take S ⊆ S ′ and j ∈ FB(S). i ∈ IS′ implies i ∈ IS by antitonicity, hence (Bi)j = iS
by hypothesis, and since iS = iS′ , j ∈ FB(S ′).
(iii) Note that IN = {1N ,−1N}. FB(N) = N iff for each j ∈ N (B1N)j = +1 and
(B(−1N))j = −1 iff the axioms (B-1) and (B-2) are satisfied.
(iv) If at least one of the axioms is violated, then, FB(N) 6= N . Hence, N 6= FB(N) ⊆ N ,
which means that FB(N) ⊂ N , and therefore B is not strong.
(v) Let B ∈ B, S ⊂ N , FB(S) 6= ∅, and j˜ ∈ FB(S)\S. Hence, for each i ∈ IS, (Bi)j˜ = iS,
and therefore I∗
S→j˜(B) = IS→j˜, which means that dα(B, S → j˜) = 1. 
Assume FB is not identically the empty set. Then the kernel of B is the following
collection of sets:
K(B) := {S ∈ 2N | FB(S) 6= ∅, and S ′ ⊂ S ⇒ FB(S ′) = ∅}.
The kernel is well defined due to isotonicity. It it the set of “true” influential coalitions.
Definition 13 Let S, T be two disjoint non empty subsets of N . B is said to be a purely
influential function of S upon T if it satisfies for all i ∈ IS:
(Bi)j =
{
iS, if j ∈ T
ij, otherwise.
(50)
The set of such functions is denoted BS→T .
Note that these functions are arbitrary on I \ IS. What is the cardinality of BS→T ?
We have
|BS→T | = 2n(2s−2)2n−s (51)
In each BS→T , there are 3 particular members. The minimal one is such that Bi = −1N
for all i ∈ I \ IS, the maximal one is such that Bi = 1N for all i ∈ I \ IS. More interesting
is the one which is the identity function on I \IS. We call it the canonical pure influential
function of S upon T , and we denote it by BS→T .
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Proposition 3 Let S, T be two disjoint non empty subsets of N . Then the following
holds:
(i) For all B ∈ BS→T , FB(S) = S ∪ T .
(ii) For each B ∈ BS→T , j ∈ N \ S
dα(B, S → j) =
{
1 if j ∈ T
0 if j ∈ N \ (S ∪ T ) (52)
(iii) If B is strong, then for any two disjoint S, T ⊂ N , B /∈ BS→T .
Proof: (i) Take t ∈ S ∪ T . If t ∈ T , then for any i ∈ IS, (Bi)t = iS. If t ∈ S, then for
any i ∈ IS, (Bi)t = it = iS. Hence t ∈ FB(S). On the other hand, take t ∈ FB(S). Then
for any i ∈ IS, (Bi)t = iS, and hence t ∈ S ∪ T .
(ii) Let B ∈ BS→T . Then for each i ∈ IS, (Bi)j = iS for j ∈ T , and (Bi)j = ij for j /∈ T .
Since IS→j ⊂ IS, we have for each i ∈ IS→j (Bi)j = iS for j ∈ T , and (Bi)j = ij for
j /∈ T . Hence, I∗S→j(B) = IS→j for j ∈ T , and I∗S→j(B) = ∅ for j ∈ N \ (S ∪ T ), and
therefore if j ∈ T , then dα(B, S → j) = 1, and if j ∈ N \ (S∪T ), then dα(B, S → j) = 0.
(iii) Suppose B is strong and there exist two disjoint sets S, T ⊂ N such that B ∈ BS→T .
Hence, in particular for each i ∈ IS and t ∈ T , (Bi)t = iS. Take a particular i ∈ IS ∩ IT
such that iS = −iT . Hence, we have (Bi)t = iS = −it for each t ∈ T . On the other hand,
since B is strong, we have for this particular T ⊂ N , T ⊆ FB(T ), and consequently, for
each t ∈ T and i ∈ IT , (Bi)t = iT = it. Contradiction.

We turn to influence functions and study their structure. B is the set of mappings
from the Boolean lattice (2N ,⊆) to (2N ,⊆), and so is itself a Boolean lattice. We denote
by ≤ the order relation, defined as B ≤ B′ iff Bi ≤ B′i for all i ∈ I (or with the set
notation BS ⊆ B′S for all S ∈ 2N). Hence B is atomic, and its atoms are influence
functions of the form
Bi :=
{
(−1N\j, 1j) if i = i0
−1N if i 6= i0
for some i0 ∈ I and j ∈ N (in set notation, BS = ∅ except for S = S0, and BS0 = j).
Thus, the number of atoms is n2n. Supremum and infimum are defined by B∨B′ = B∪B′
and B ∧B′ = B ∩B′.
Next, we define several influence functions B ∈ B and investigate their properties. In
particular, for each influence function analyzed, we determine the set of followers and the
values of the weighted influence functions.
Some simple examples of influence functions are:
(i) Majority function - Let n ≥ t ≥ bn
2
c+ 1, and introduce
i+ := |{k ∈ N | ik = +1}| (53)
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We define B ∈ B such that for each i ∈ I
Bi :=
{
1N if i
+ ≥ t
−1N if i+ < t
(54)
(ii) k˜ ∈ N is a guru - We define B ∈ B such that for each i ∈ I and j ∈ N
(Bi)j = ik˜ (55)
(iii) The identity function (no influence), i.e., for each i ∈ I
Bi = i (56)
(iv) The reversal function (systematic reversal of inclination; no clear phenomenon of in-
fluence), i.e., for each i ∈ I
Bi = −i (57)
(v) Order preserving functions, i.e., for each i, i′ ∈ I
if i ≤ i′, then Bi ≤ Bi′, (58)
where
i ≤ i′ ⇐⇒ {k ∈ N | ik = +1} ⊆ {k ∈ N | i′k = +1} (59)
(vi) Order reversing functions, i.e., for each i, i′ ∈ I
if i ≤ i′, then Bi ≥ Bi′ (60)
(vii) Let t ∈ (0, n]. Functions satisfying for each i ∈ I
if i+ ≥ t, then i ≤ Bi (61)
(effect of mass psychology when i has a sufficient number of +1)
REMARK: Defining this with equivalence: i ≤ Bi iff i+ ≥ t would give a problem
for t ∈ (0, n]: we would have i 6≤ Bi for i+ < t, but for i = −1N , we have i ≤ Bi.
(viii) Let t ∈ [0, n). Functions satisfying for each i ∈ I
if i+ ≤ t, then i ≥ Bi (62)
(effect of the empty restaurant when i has a low number of +1)
REMARK: Defining this with equivalence: i ≥ Bi iff i+ ≤ t would give a problem
for t ∈ [0, n): we would have i 6≥ Bi for i+ > t, but for i = 1N , we have i ≥ Bi.
(ix) Let t ∈ (0, n]. Functions mixing the last two cases, i.e., satisfying for each i ∈ I
i ≤ Bi iff i+ ≥ t, and i ≥ Bi iff i+ < t (63)
Let us introduce for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S:
I+S→j := {i ∈ IS→j | iS = +1} (64)
I−S→j := {i ∈ IS→j | iS = −1} (65)
and additionally,
I+S→j,>t := {i ∈ I+S→j | i+ > t} for t < n− 1 (66)
I+S→j,≥t := {i ∈ I+S→j | i+ ≥ t} for t < n (67)
I−S→j,<t := {i ∈ I−S→j | i+ < t} for t > 1. (68)
We list some basic properties of the influence functions mentioned.
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Proposition 4 Let n ≥ t ≥ bn
2
c + 1 and the influence function B be defined by (54).
Then the following holds:
(i) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S
dα(B, S → j) =

1 if s ≥ t
1
2
if s < t = n∑
i∈I+
S→j,≥t
αS→ji +
∑
i∈I−
S→j,<t
αS→ji∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
if s < t < n
(69)
(ii) For each S ⊆ N
FB(S) =
{
N if s ≥ t
∅ if s < t (70)
(iii) The kernel is K(B) = {S ⊆ N | |S| = t}.
Proof: (i) Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N be such that s ≥ t, and j ∈ N \ S. If iS = +1, then i+ ≥ t
and hence in particular (Bi)j = +1 = iS. If iS = −1, then i+ < t and hence in particular
(Bi)j = −1 = iS. This means that I∗S→j(B) = IS→j, and therefore dα(B, S → j) = 1.
Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N be such that s < t, t = n, and j ∈ N \ S. Hence, for each i ∈ I \ {1N},
Bi = −1N , and therefore I∗S→j(B) = I−S→j. By virtue of (29), we have
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I−S→j α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
=
∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
2
∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
=
1
2
Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N be such that s < t, t < n, and j ∈ N \ S. Hence, we get
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I∗S→j(B) α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
=
∑
i∈I+S→j,≥t α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
(ii) Let S ⊆ N be such that s ≥ t. Suppose that FB(S) 6= N . This means that there
exists j ∈ N such that j /∈ FB(S). Hence, there is i˜ ∈ IS such that (Bi˜)j = −i˜S. Suppose
i˜S = +1. Hence, i
+ ≥ t, and therefore for each k ∈ N , (Bi˜)k = +1 = i˜S. Suppose
than that i˜S = −1. Hence, i+ < t, and therefore for each k ∈ N , (Bi˜)k = −1 = i˜S.
Contradiction.
Let S ⊆ N be such that s < t. Suppose that FB(S) 6= ∅. Let j˜ ∈ FB(S). Hence, for each
i ∈ IS, (Bi)j˜ = iS. Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S = −i˜k for each k /∈ S. If i˜S = +1, then
i˜+ < t, and hence for each j ∈ N , (Bi˜)j = −1 = −i˜S. If i˜S = −1, then i˜+ ≥ t, and hence
for each j ∈ N , (Bi˜)j = +1 = −i˜S. Contradiction.
(iii) By virtue of (70), we have the following. If |S| < t, then FB(S) = ∅, and hence
S /∈ K(B). If |S| = t, then FB(S) = N , but for each S ′ ⊂ S, |S ′| < t, and therefore
FB(S
′) = ∅. Hence, S ∈ K(B). If |S| > t, then FB(S) = N , and there exists S ′ ⊂ S such
that |S ′| ≥ t, which means that FB(S ′) = N . Hence, S /∈ K(B). 
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Proposition 5 Let k˜ ∈ N and the influence function B be defined by (55). Then the
following holds:
(i) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ (S ∪ {k˜})
dα(B, S → j) =
{
1 if k˜ ∈ S
1
2
if k˜ /∈ S (71)
(ii) For each S ⊆ N
FB(S) =
{
N if k˜ ∈ S
∅ if k˜ /∈ S (72)
(iii) The kernel is K(B) = {k˜}.
(iv) B is the purely influential function of {k˜} upon N \ {k˜}, i.e., B ∈ B{k˜}→N\{k˜}.
Proof: (i) Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N be such that k˜ ∈ S, and j ∈ N \ S. Hence, for each i ∈ I,
(Bi)j = ik˜. This means in particular that I
∗
S→j(B) = IS→j, and hence dα(B, S → j) = 1.
Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N be such that k˜ /∈ S, and j ∈ N \ (S ∪ {k˜}). Hence, if i ∈ IS→j is such
that iS = ik˜, then i ∈ I∗S→j(B), and if i ∈ IS→j is such that iS = −ik˜, then i /∈ I∗S→j(B).
Hence, by virtue of (29), dα(B, S → j) = 12 .
(ii) Let S ⊆ N be such that k˜ ∈ S. Hence, for each i ∈ I, iS = ik˜. Since k˜ is a dictator,
we have for each j ∈ N and i ∈ I, (Bi)j = ik˜. This means in particular that for each
j ∈ N and i ∈ IS, (Bi)j = ik˜ = iS, and therefore FB(S) = N .
Let S ⊆ N be such that k˜ /∈ S. Suppose that FB(S) 6= ∅. Let j˜ ∈ FB(S). Hence, for
each i ∈ IS, (Bi)j˜ = iS. Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S = −i˜k. Hence, for each j ∈ N ,
(Bi˜)j = i˜k˜ = −i˜S, and in particular, (Bi˜)j˜ = i˜k˜ = −i˜S. Contradiction.
(iii) By virtue of (72), we have the following. If k˜ /∈ S, then FB(S) = ∅, and hence
S /∈ K(B). If k˜ ∈ S and |S| > 1, then FB(S) = N = FB(k˜), which means that S /∈ K(B).
Finally, since FB(k˜) = N and FB(∅) = ∅, we have K(B) = {k˜}.
(iv) It comes immediately from (50) and (55). 
Proposition 6 Let the influence function B be defined by (56). Then the following holds:
(i) B is the only influence function which is strong.
(ii) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, dα(B, S → j) = 0.
(iii) For each S ⊆ N , FB(S) = S.
(iv) The kernel is K(B) = {{k}, k ∈ N}.
Proof: (i) First of all, note that ∅ ⊆ FB(∅). Take an arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ S. By
virtue of (56), for each i ∈ IS, (Bi)j = ij = iS, and therefore j ∈ FB(S) for each j ∈ S.
Hence, S ⊆ FB(S) for each S ⊆ N .
Suppose now there is B˜ 6= B which is strong. Hence, for each S ⊆ N , S ⊆ FB˜(S).
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Moreover, there is i˜ ∈ I and k ∈ N such that (B˜i˜)k = −i˜k. Take S = {j ∈ N | i˜j = i˜k}.
Then, k ∈ S, but k /∈ FB˜(S), and therefore S 6⊆ FB˜(S). Hence, B˜ is not strong.
(ii) If B satisfies (56), then for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, I∗S→j(B) = ∅. Hence, by
virtue of (31), dα(B, S → j) = 0.
(iii) Note that S ⊆ FB(S), because if j ∈ S, then in particular for each i ∈ IS, (Bi)j =
ij = iS. Suppose FB(S) 6⊆ S. Hence, there is k /∈ S such that k ∈ FB(S), and therefore for
each i ∈ IS, (Bi)k = iS. Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S = −i˜k. Then we have (Bi˜)k = i˜S = −i˜k,
but Bi˜ = i˜. Contradiction.
(iv) By virtue of the point (iii), for each S ⊆ N , FB(S) = S. Hence, for each k ∈ N ,
{k} ∈ K(B). For each S ⊆ N such that |S| > 1, FB(S) = S, but also for each S ′ such
that ∅ 6= S ′ ⊂ S, FB(S ′) = S ′ 6= ∅. Hence K(B) = {{k}, k ∈ N}. 
Proposition 7 Let the influence function B be defined by (57). Then the following holds:
(i) None of the axioms (B-1), (B-2) is satisfied.
(ii) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, dα(B, S → j) = 1.
(iii) For each S ⊆ N , FB(S) = ∅.
(iv) For any two disjoint S, T ⊆ N , B /∈ BS→T .
Proof: (i) From (57), B1N = −1N and B(−1N) = 1N .
(ii) Take arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N\S. If B is defined by (57), then I∗S→j(B) = IS→j.
Hence, dα(B, S → j) = 1.
(iii) Suppose there is S ⊆ N such that FB(S) 6= ∅, that is, there is j ∈ FB(S). Then,
for each i ∈ IS, (Bi)j = iS. Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S = i˜j. Hence, (Bi˜)j = i˜S = i˜j, but
Bi˜ = −i˜. Contradiction.
(iv) Take two arbitrary S, T ⊆ N such that S ∩T = ∅. Note that 1N ∈ IS and −1N ∈ IS.
By virtue of (57), (Bi)j = −ij for each j ∈ N . Hence, (B1N)j = −1 and (B(−1N))j = +1
for each j ∈ T . 
Proposition 8 Let the influence function B be defined by (58). Then the following holds:
(i) At least one of the axioms (B-1), (B-2) may be violated.
(ii) There is B ∈ B such that for some ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, dα(B, S → j) = 1.
(iii) There is B ∈ B such that for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, dα(B, S → j) = 0.
(iv) There is B ∈ B such that FB(S) = S for each S ⊆ N .
There is B ∈ B such that FB(S) = N for some S ⊆ N .
There is B ∈ B such that FB(S) = ∅ for some S ⊆ N .
(v) There exists B ∈ B such that for any two disjoint S, T ⊂ N , B /∈ BS→T .
(vi) There exists B ∈ B such that B ∈ BS→T for some S, T ⊂ N , S ∩ T = ∅.
Proof: (i) Assume, for instance that Bi = Bi′ for each i, i′ ∈ I. For the violation of
only one axiom, (B-1) (respectively (B-2)), define for example Bi = −1N (respectively
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Bi = 1N). For the violation of both axioms, define for instance (Bi)j = +1 if j ≤ bN2 c,
and (Bi)j = −1 if j > bN2 c, for n ≥ 2.
(ii) Define B as follows. There is k ∈ N who is a guru, i.e., (Bi)j = ik for each i ∈ I and
j ∈ N . Then, for each S ⊆ N with k ∈ S we have I∗S→j(B) = IS→j for each j ∈ N \ S,
and consequently, dα(B, S → j) = 1.
(iii) Define B such that Bi = i for each i ∈ I. By virtue of Proposition 6, (ii), we get
dα(B, S → j) = 0.
(iv) Take Bi = i for each i ∈ I. Then FB(S) = S for each S ⊆ N .
Take now an arbitrary k ∈ N , and define B such that k is a guru. Then
FB(S) =
{
N if k ∈ S
∅ if k /∈ S.
(v) It results immediately from Proposition 3, (iv), since the function satisfying (56) is
strong and also satisfies (58).
(vi) Take B from the proof of (ii), S = {k} and T = N \ k. Hence, B ∈ BS→T . 
Proposition 9 Let the influence function B be defined by (60). Then the following holds:
(i) At least one of the axioms (B-1), (B-2) is violated.
(ii) There is B ∈ B such that for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, dα(B, S → j) = 1.
(iii) There is B ∈ B such that for some ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, dα(B, S → j) = 0.
(iv) For each S ⊆ N , FB(S) = ∅.
(v) There exists B ∈ B such that for any two disjoint S, T ⊆ N , B /∈ BS→T .
Proof: (i) If both axioms are satisfied, then B1N = 1N and B(−1N) = −1N , but then
(60) is violated.
(ii) Define B such that Bi = −i for each i ∈ I. By virtue of Proposition 7, (ii), we get
dα(B, S → j) = 1 for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S.
(iii) Define B as follows. There is k ∈ N such that for each j ∈ N (Bi)j = −ik. Then, for
each S ⊆ N such that k ∈ S, I∗S→j(B) = ∅ for each j ∈ N \ S.
(iv) Suppose there is B satisfying (60) such that for a certain S ⊆ N , FB(S) 6= ∅. Let
k ∈ FB(S). Hence, for each i ∈ IS, (Bi)k = iS. Take i, i′ ∈ IS such that iS = ik = −1 and
i′S = i
′
k = +1, and ij = i
′
j for each each j ∈ N \ (S ∪ {k}). Hence, i ≤ i′, (Bi)k = −1,
(Bi′)k = +1, but this means that Bi 6≥ Bi′. Contradiction.
(v) It results immediately from Proposition 7, (iv), since (57) also satisfies (60). 
Proposition 10 Let the influence function B be defined by (61). Then the following
holds:
(i) For each t ∈ [0, n] there is B ∈ B such that for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S,
dα(B, S → j) = 0. (73)
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(ii) If t ∈ {0, 1}, then for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S, and B ∈ B,
dα(B, S → j) ≤ 1
2
. (74)
Moreover, there is B ∈ B such that for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S,
dα(B, S → j) = 1
2
. (75)
(iii) If t > 1, then for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s > n − t, and j ∈ N \ S, there exists
B ∈ B such that
dα(B, S → j) = 1.
(iv) If t > 1, then for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s ≤ n− t, j ∈ N \ S, and B ∈ B,
dα(B, S → j) ≤
∑
i∈I+S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
, (76)
in particular,
d(B, S → j) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2n−s
t−2∑
p=0
(
n− s− 1
p
)
(77)
d(B, S → j) ∈ {0, 1
2
}.
Moreover, for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s ≤ n − t and j ∈ N \ S, there is B ∈ B
such that
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I+S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
. (78)
(v) For each B ∈ B and S ⊆ N ,
FB(S) ⊆
{
N if s > n− t and t > 1
S if s ≤ n− t (79)
Moreover, there is B ∈ B such that for each S ⊆ N , FB(S) = S.
Proof: (i) Define B such that Bi = i for each i ∈ I. By virtue of Proposition 6, (ii), we
get dα(B, S → j) = 0 for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S.
(ii) Let B be defined by (61) and t ∈ {0, 1}. By virtue of (30), for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and
j ∈ N \ S ∑
i∈IS→j
αS→ji = 2
∑
i∈I+S→j
αS→ji
Note that I∗S→j(B) ∩ I−S→j = ∅. Hence,
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I∗S→j(B) α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
≤
∑
i∈I+S→j α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
=
1
2
.
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Define B such that Bi = 1N for each i ∈ I. This B satisfies (61). Take arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆
N and j ∈ N \ S. Note that I∗S→j(B) = I+S→j. Hence, for this B
dα(B, S → j) = 1
2
.
(iii) Let t > 1. Take arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s > n − t, and j /∈ S. Define B as
follows:
(Bi)k =
{
iS if i ∈ IS→j and k = j
ik otherwise
Note that this B satisfies (61), because if i ∈ I−S→j, then i+ < t, and if i ∈ I \ I−S→j, then
(61) is satisfied. We have dα(B, S → j) = 1.
(iv) Let B be defined by (61) and t > 1. Take arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s ≤ n− t,
and j /∈ S. Note that if i ∈ I−S→j is such that i+ ≥ t, then i /∈ I∗S→j(B). Hence,
dα(B, S → j) ≤
∑
i∈I+S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
.
Moreover,
d(B, S → j) = |I
∗
S→j(B)|
2n−s
≤ |I
+
S→j|
2n−s
+
1
2n−s
t−2∑
p=0
(
n− s− 1
p
)
=
1
2
+
1
2n−s
t−2∑
p=0
(
n− s− 1
p
)
Moreover, d(B, S → j) 6= 1, because if i ∈ I−S→j is such that ik = +1 for each k /∈ S, then
i /∈ I∗S→j(B). Hence, d(B, S → j) ∈ {0, 12}.
Define B as follows. For each k 6= j, (Bi)k = ik for i ∈ I, and
(Bi)j =

iS if i ∈ I+S→j
iS if i ∈ I−S→j and i+ < t
ij otherwise
This B satisfies (61), and we get then
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I+S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
.
(v) Let t ∈ [0, n] and s ≤ n − t. Suppose there is B ∈ B satisfying (61) such that
FB(S) 6⊆ S for a certain S ⊆ N . This means that FB(S) 6= ∅, since ∅ ⊆ S for each S.
Hence, there is k /∈ S such that k ∈ FB(S). This means that for each i ∈ IS, (Bi)k = iS.
Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S = −1, i˜k = +1, and i˜+ ≥ t. Such an i˜ always exists, because
n − s ≥ t. We have (Bi˜)k = i˜S = −1, and therefore i˜ 6≤ Bi˜. But since i˜+ ≥ t, we have
i˜ ≤ Bi˜. Contradiction.
If we take Bi = i for each i ∈ I, then for each S ⊆ N , FB(S) = S. 
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Proposition 11 Let the influence function B be defined by (62). Then the following
holds:
(i) For each t ∈ [0, n] there is B ∈ B such that for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S
dα(B, S → j) = 0.
(ii) If t ∈ {n− 1, n}, then for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S
dα(B, S → j) ≤ 1
2
.
Moreover, there is B ∈ B such that for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S
dα(B, S → j) = 1
2
.
(iii) If t < n − 1, then for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s > t, and j ∈ N \ S, there exists
B ∈ B such that
dα(B, S → j) = 1.
(iv) If t < n− 1, then for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s ≤ t, and j ∈ N \ S
dα(B, S → j) ≤
∑
i∈I−S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I+S→j,>t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
(80)
in particular,
d(B, S → j) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2n−s
n−s−1∑
p=t−s+1
(
n− s− 1
p
)
(81)
d(B, S → j) ∈ {0, 1
2
}.
Moreover, for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s ≤ t, and j ∈ N \ S, there exists B ∈ B
such that
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I−S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I+S→j,>t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
. (82)
(v) For each B ∈ B and S ⊆ N ,
FB(S) ⊆
{
N if s > t and t < n− 1
S if s ≤ t (83)
Moreover, there is B ∈ B such that for each S ⊆ N , FB(S) = S.
Proof: (i) Define B such that Bi = i for each i ∈ I. By virtue of Proposition 6, (ii), we
get dα(B, S → j) = 0 for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S.
(ii) Let B be defined by (62) and t ∈ {n − 1, n}. By virtue of (30), for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N
and j ∈ N \ S ∑
i∈IS→j
αS→ji = 2
∑
i∈I−S→j
αS→ji
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Note that I∗S→j(B) ∩ I+S→j = ∅. Hence,
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I∗S→j(B) α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
≤
∑
i∈I−S→j α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
=
1
2
.
Define B such that Bi = −1N for each i ∈ I. This B satisfies (62). Take arbitrary
∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S. Note that I∗S→j(B) = I−S→j. Hence, for this B
dα(B, S → j) = 1
2
.
(iii) Let t < n − 1. Take arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s > t, and j /∈ S. Define B as
follows:
(Bi)k =
{
iS if i ∈ IS→j and k = j
ik otherwise
Note that this B satisfies (62), because if i ∈ I+S→j, then i+ > t, and if i ∈ I \ I+S→j, then
(62) is satisfied. We have dα(B, S → j) = 1.
(iv) Let B be defined by (62) and t < n− 1. Take arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s ≤ t,
and j /∈ S. Note that if i ∈ I+S→j is such that i+ ≤ t, then i /∈ I∗S→j(B). Hence,
dα(B, S → j) ≤
∑
i∈I−S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I+S→j,>t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
.
Moreover,
d(B, S → j) = |I
∗
S→j(B)|
2n−s
≤ |I
−
S→j(B)|
2n−s
+
1
2n−s
n−s−1∑
p=t−s+1
(
n− s− 1
p
)
=
1
2
+
1
2n−s
n−s−1∑
p=t−s+1
(
n− s− 1
p
)
d(B, S → j) 6= 1, because if i ∈ I+S→j is such that ik = −1 for each k /∈ S, then
i /∈ I∗S→j(B). Hence, d(B, S → j) ∈ {0, 12}.
Define B as follows. For each k 6= j, (Bi)k = ik for i ∈ I, and
(Bi)j =

iS if i ∈ I−S→j
iS if i ∈ I+S→j and i+ > t
ij otherwise
This B satisfies (62), and we get then
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I−S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I+S→j,>t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
.
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(v) Let ∈ [0, n] and s ≤ t. Suppose there is B ∈ B satisfying (62) such that FB(S) 6⊆ S
for a certain S ⊆ N . This means that FB(S) 6= ∅, since ∅ ⊆ S for each S. Hence, there
is k /∈ S such that k ∈ FB(S). This means that for each i ∈ IS, (Bi)k = iS. Take i˜ ∈ IS
such that i˜S = +1, i˜k = −1, and i˜+ ≤ t. Such an i˜ always exists, because s ≤ t. We have
(Bi˜)k = i˜S = +1, and therefore i˜ 6≥ Bi˜. But since i˜+ ≤ t, we have i˜ ≥ Bi˜. Contradiction.
If we take Bi = i for each i ∈ I, then for each S ⊆ N , FB(S) = S. 
Proposition 12 Let the influence function B be defined by (63). Then the following
holds:
(i) For each t ∈ (0, n] there is B ∈ B such that for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S,
dα(B, S → j) = 0. (84)
(ii) If t ∈ {1, n}, then for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S, and B ∈ B,
dα(B, S → j) ≤ 1
2
. (85)
Moreover, there is B ∈ B such that for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S,
dα(B, S → j) = 1
2
. (86)
(iii) If 1 < t < n, then for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s ≥ t > n− s, and j ∈ N \ S, there
exists B ∈ B such that
dα(B, S → j) = 1.
(iv) If 1 < t < n, then for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that t ≤ s ≤ n− t, j ∈ N \S, and B ∈ B,
dα(B, S → j) ≤
∑
i∈I+S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
(87)
in particular,
d(B, S → j) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2n−s
t−2∑
p=0
(
n− s− 1
p
)
(88)
d(B, S → j) ∈ {0, 1
2
}
Moreover, for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that t ≤ s ≤ n− t and j ∈ N \ S, there is B ∈ B
such that
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I+S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
. (89)
(v) If 1 < t < n, then for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that n− t < s < t, and j ∈ N \ S
dα(B, S → j) ≤
∑
i∈I−S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I+S→j,≥t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
(90)
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in particular,
d(B, S → j) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2n−s
n−s−1∑
p=t−s
(
n− s− 1
p
)
(91)
d(B, S → j) ∈ {0, 1
2
}
Moreover, for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that n − t < s < t, and j ∈ N \ S, there exists
B ∈ B such that
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I−S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I+S→j,≥t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
. (92)
(vi) If 1 < t < n, then for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s < t ≤ n− s, j ∈ N \S, and B ∈ B,
dα(B, S → j) ≤
∑
i∈I+S→j,≥t α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
(93)
in particular,
d(B, S → j) ≤ 1
2n−s
n−s−1∑
p=t−s
(
n− s− 1
p
)
+
1
2n−s
t−2∑
p=0
(
n− s− 1
p
)
(94)
d(B, S → j) = 0
Moreover, for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s < t ≤ n− s and j ∈ N \ S, there is B ∈ B
such that
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I+S→j,≥t α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
. (95)
(vii) For each B ∈ B and S ⊆ N ,
FB(S) ⊆
{
N if s ≥ t > n− s
S otherwise
(96)
and additionally, if s ≥ t > n− s, then for each B ∈ B and S ⊆ N , S ⊆ FB(S).
Moreover, there is B ∈ B such that for each S ⊆ N , FB(S) = S.
Proof: (i) Define B such that Bi = i for each i ∈ I. By virtue of Proposition 6, (ii), we
get dα(B, S → j) = 0 for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S.
(ii) Let B be defined by (63). By virtue of (30), for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S∑
i∈IS→j
αS→ji = 2
∑
i∈I−S→j
αS→ji = 2
∑
i∈I+S→j
αS→ji
Let t = 1. Note that I∗S→j(B) ∩ I−S→j = ∅. Hence,
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I∗S→j(B) α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
≤
∑
i∈I+S→j α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
=
1
2
.
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Define B such that Bi = 1N for each i ∈ I. This B satisfies (63). Take arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆
N and j ∈ N \ S. Note that I∗S→j(B) = I+S→j. Hence, for this B
dα(B, S → j) = 1
2
.
Now, let t = n. Then I∗S→j(B) ∩ I+S→j = ∅. Hence,
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I∗S→j(B) α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
≤
∑
i∈I−S→j α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
=
1
2
.
Define B such that Bi = −1N for each i ∈ I. This B satisfies (63). Take arbitrary
∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S. Note that I∗S→j(B) = I−S→j. Hence, for this B
dα(B, S → j) = 1
2
.
(iii) Let 1 < t < n. Take arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s ≥ t > n− s, and j /∈ S. Define
B such that for each k ∈ N
(Bi)k =
{
iS if i ∈ IS→j
ik otherwise
Note that this B satisfies (63). We have dα(B, S → j) = 1.
(iv) Let B be defined by (63) and t > 1. Take arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that t ≤ s ≤ n−t,
and j /∈ S. Note that if i ∈ I−S→j is such that i+ ≥ t, then i /∈ I∗S→j(B). Hence,
dα(B, S → j) ≤
∑
i∈I+S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
.
Moreover,
d(B, S → j) = |I
∗
S→j(B)|
2n−s
≤ |I
+
S→j(B)|
2n−s
+
1
2n−s
t−2∑
p=0
(
n− s− 1
p
)
=
1
2
+
1
2n−s
t−2∑
p=0
(
n− s− 1
p
)
d(B, S → j) 6= 1, because if i ∈ I−S→j is such that ik = +1 for each k /∈ S, then
i /∈ I∗S→j(B). Hence, d(B, S → j) ∈ {0, 12}.
Define B as follows. For each k 6= j, (Bi)k = ik for i ∈ I, and
(Bi)j =

iS if i ∈ I+S→j
iS if i ∈ I−S→j and i+ < t
ij otherwise
This B satisfies (63), and we get then
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I+S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
.
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(v) Let B be defined by (63) and 1 < t < n. Take arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that
n − t < s < t, and j /∈ S. Note that if i ∈ I+S→j is such that i+ < t, then i /∈ I∗S→j(B).
Hence,
dα(B, S → j) ≤
∑
i∈I−S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I+S→j,≥t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
.
Moreover,
d(B, S → j) = |I
∗
S→j(B)|
2n−s
≤ |I
−
S→j(B)|
2n−s
+
1
2n−s
n−s−1∑
p=t−s
(
n− s− 1
p
)
=
1
2
+
1
2n−s
n−s−1∑
p=t−s
(
n− s− 1
p
)
d(B, S → j) 6= 1, because if i ∈ I+S→j is such that ik = −1 for each k /∈ S, then
i /∈ I∗S→j(B). Hence, d(B, S → j) ∈ {0, 12}.
Define B as follows. For each k 6= j, (Bi)k = ik for i ∈ I, and
(Bi)j =

iS if i ∈ I−S→j
iS if i ∈ I+S→j and i+ ≥ t
ij otherwise
This B satisfies (63), and we get then
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I−S→j α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I+S→j,≥t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
.
(vi) Let B be defined by (63) and 1 < t < n. Take arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that
s < t ≤ n − s, and j /∈ S. Note that if i ∈ I+S→j is such that i+ < t, then i /∈ I∗S→j(B),
and if i ∈ I−S→j is such that i+ ≥ t, then i /∈ I∗S→j(B). Hence,
dα(B, S → j) ≤
∑
i∈I+S→j,≥t α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
.
Moreover,
d(B, S → j) = |I
∗
S→j(B)|
2n−s
≤ 1
2n−s
n−s−1∑
p=t−s
(
n− s− 1
p
)
+
1
2n−s
t−2∑
p=0
(
n− s− 1
p
)
d(B, S → j) = 0, because if i ∈ I+S→j is such that ik = −1 for each k /∈ S, then
i /∈ I∗S→j(B), and if i ∈ I−S→j is such that ik = +1 for each k /∈ S, then i /∈ I∗S→j(B).
Define B as follows. For each k 6= j, (Bi)k = ik for i ∈ I, and
(Bi)j =

iS if i ∈ I+S→j and i+ ≥ t
iS if i ∈ I−S→j and i+ < t
ij otherwise
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This B satisfies (63), and we get then
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I+S→j,≥t α
S→j
i +
∑
i∈I−S→j,<t α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
.
(vii) Let s < t or t ≤ n− s. Suppose there is B ∈ B satisfying (63) such that FB(S) 6⊆ S
for a certain S ⊆ N . This means that FB(S) 6= ∅, since ∅ ⊆ S for each S. Hence, there is
k /∈ S such that k ∈ FB(S). This means that for each i ∈ IS, (Bi)k = iS.
Let s < t. Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S = +1, i˜k = −1, and i˜+ < t. Such an i˜ always exists,
because s < t. We have (Bi˜)k = i˜S = +1, and therefore i˜ 6≥ Bi˜. But since i˜+ < t, we have
i˜ ≥ Bi˜. Contradiction.
Let t ≤ n − s. Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S = −1, i˜k = +1, and i˜+ ≥ t. Again, such an i˜
always exists, because t ≤ n − s. We have (Bi˜)k = i˜S = −1, and therefore i˜ 6≤ Bi˜. But
since i˜+ ≥ t, we have i˜ ≤ Bi˜. Contradiction.
Let s ≥ t > n − s. Suppose there is B ∈ B such that S 6⊆ FB(S) for a certain S ⊆ N .
This means that there k ∈ S such that k /∈ FB(S), and therefore there is i˜ ∈ IS such
that (Bi˜)k = −i˜S. If i˜S = +1, then (Bi˜)k = −1, and hence i˜ 6≤ Bi˜. But since s ≥ t, we
have i+ ≥ t, and therefore i˜ ≤ Bi˜. Hence, i˜S = −1, and (Bi˜)k = +1. But this means that
i˜ 6≥ Bi˜. Since t > n− s, we have i+ < t, and therefore i˜ ≥ Bi˜. Contradiction.
If we take Bi = i for each i ∈ I, then for each S ⊆ N , FB(S) = S.

5 Success, decisiveness and the revised Hoede-Bakker index
Let us consider the ‘power part’ of the global index. First of all, we adopt the following
three axioms on gd ∈ G:
AXIOM (G-1):
∀i, i′ ∈ I [Bi ≤ Bi′ ⇒ gd(Bi) ≤ gd(Bi′)], (97)
where
Bi ≤ Bi′ ⇐⇒ {k ∈ N | (Bi)k = +1} ⊆ {k ∈ N | (Bi′)k = +1} (98)
AXIOM (G-2):
gd(1N) = +1 (99)
AXIOM (G-3):
gd(−1N) = −1. (100)
Now, after separating the two functions B and gd, we define Success, Failure, Luck
and Decisiveness of a player starting from the final decision of the player, not as before
from the inclination. For instance, a player is said to be successful if his decision coincides
with the group decision.
Given a probability distribution p : I → [0, 1] over all inclination vectors, and B ∈ B,
we define pB = p ◦B−1 on I (probability of the decision vectors).
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Since some decision vectors may never appear after applying the influence function,
we define now the group decision function gd : I → {+1,−1} on the set of all n-vectors,
assigning (as before) the value +1 if the group decision is ‘yes’, and −1 if the group
decision is ‘no’. Moreover, for b ∈ I and k ∈ N , we define b−k ∈ I by
b−kj =
{
bj if j 6= k
−bj if j = k . (101)
Definition 14 Given gd ∈ G, pB : I → [0, 1], we define for each k ∈ N
– Player k’s Success
SUCk(gd, pB) := Prob(k is successful) =
∑
{b∈I|bk=gd(b)}
pB(b) (102)
– Player k’s Failure
FAILk(gd, pB) := Prob(k fails) =
∑
{b∈I|bk=−gd(b)}
pB(b) (103)
– Player k’s Decisiveness
DECk(gd, pB) := Prob(k is decisive) =
∑
{b∈I|bk=gd(b)=−gd(b−k)}
pB(b) (104)
– Player k’s Luck
LUCKk(gd, pB) := Prob(k is lucky) =
∑
{b∈I|bk=gd(b)=gd(b−k)}
pB(b) (105)
According to Barry [2], the following relation between Success, Luck, and Decisiveness
holds:
Success = Decisiveness + Luck,
and in our case, we have for each k ∈ N , pB, and gd ∈ G
SUCk(gd, pB) = DECk(gd, pB) + LUCKk(gd, pB) (106)
SUCk(gd, pB) = 1− FAILk(gd, pB). (107)
The revised Hoede-Bakker index looks now as follows:
Definition 15 Given B ∈ B, gd ∈ G, p : I → [0, 1], we define for each k ∈ N
φk(B, gd, p) :=
∑
{i|(Bi)k=+1}
p(i)gd(Bi)−
∑
{i|(Bi)k=−1}
p(i)gd(Bi). (108)
Fact 3 Given B ∈ B, gd ∈ G, and p : I → [0, 1], for each k ∈ N
φk(B, gd, p) = SUCk(gd, pB)− FAILk(gd, pB). (109)
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Proof: Let B ∈ B, gd ∈ G, p : I → [0, 1], and k ∈ N . From (108), we have
φk(B, gd, p) =
∑
{i|(Bi)k=+1}
p(i)gd(Bi)−
∑
{i|(Bi)k=−1}
p(i)gd(Bi)
=
∑
{i|(Bi)k=gd(Bi)}
p(i)−
∑
{i|(Bi)k=−gd(Bi)}
p(i)
By virtue of (102) and (103),
SUCk(gd, pB)− FAILk(gd, pB) =
∑
{b∈I|bk=gd(b)}
pB(b)−
∑
{b∈I|bk=−gd(b)}
pB(b)
=
∑
{b∈B(I)|bk=gd(b)}
∑
{i|Bi=b}
p(i)−
∑
{b∈B(I)|bk=−gd(b)}
∑
{i|Bi=b}
p(i)
=
∑
{i|(Bi)k=gd(Bi)}
p(i)−
∑
{i|(Bi)k=−gd(Bi)}
p(i) = ψk(B, gd, p)

Let us notice that while φ is equal to ‘Success − Failure’ under the new definition of
being successful (based on decisions, not as before on inclinations), in general it is not
equal to ‘Decisiveness’ anymore.
6 The global index
There is a trivial relation between the ‘influence part’ and the ‘power part’ of the global
index if all inclination vectors are equally probable. Let p∗ : I → [0, 1] be the uniform
distribution, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I [p∗(i) = 1
2n
]. (110)
Assuming that axioms (B-1) and (B-2) are satisfied, the following fact holds:
Fact 4 If d(B, k → j) = 0 for each k ∈ N , then φj(B, gd, p∗) = GHBj(B, gd).
Proof: Let d(B, k → j) = 0 for each k ∈ N . This means that for each k ∈ N
|{i ∈ I | (Bi)j = ik = −ij}| = 0. Hence, for each k ∈ N and i ∈ I, if ik = −ij, then
ij = (Bi)j. Moreover, by virtue of (B-1) and (B-2), B1N = 1N and B(−1N) = −1N .
Hence
φj(B, gd, p
∗) =
1
2n
 ∑
{i|(Bi)j=+1}
gd(Bi)−
∑
{i|(Bi)j=−1}
gd(Bi)

=
1
2n
 ∑
{i|ij=+1}
gd(Bi)−
∑
{i|ij=−1}
gd(Bi)
 = GHBj(B, gd).

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Example 2 In order to illustrate the notions introduced in the paper, let us consider
the following example. We have a three-actor family network in which player 1 (child) is
influenced by his mother and his father (players 2 and 3, respectively). If the parents have
the same inclination, the child will follow them, but if their inclinations differ from each
other, player 1 will decide according to his own inclination. The family has to decide for a
long Sunday bicycle trip, but since the weather happens to be quite risky, the actors are
not that enthusiastic to decide for the trip. Moreover, a new attractive computer game, a
romance just bought and looking very interesting, and a telecast of an important football
match are of importance when making the decision. The inclinations of the players to say
‘yes’ are independent of each other and their probabilities are equal to 1
2
, 1
3
, and 0, for
the child, the mother and the father, respectively. The parents try not to discriminate
their child in family decision-making, and it is agreed that the family decides for the trip
if at least two family members say ‘yes’. Table 1 presents the probability distribution
over all inclination vectors, and the decision vectors, while Table 2 shows the probability
distribution over all decision vectors, and the group decisions.
Table 1. The inclination and decision vectors
i ∈ I (1, 1, 1) (1, 1,−1) (1,−1, 1) (−1, 1, 1) (1,−1,−1) (−1, 1,−1) (−1,−1, 1) (−1,−1,−1)
p(i) 0 1
6
0 0 1
3
1
6
0 1
3
B(i) (1, 1, 1) (1, 1,−1) (1,−1, 1) (1, 1, 1) (−1,−1,−1) (−1, 1,−1) (−1,−1, 1) (−1,−1,−1)
Table 2. The group decision
b ∈ B(I) (1, 1, 1) (1, 1,−1) (1,−1, 1) (−1, 1,−1) (−1,−1, 1) (−1,−1,−1)
pB(b) 0
1
6
0 1
6
0 2
3
gd(b) +1 +1 +1 −1 −1 −1
Moreover, gd(−1, 1, 1) = +1, and gd(1,−1,−1) = −1.
Based on the given information, we get the following:
∀k, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} [d(B, k → j) = 0]
∀d ∈ {d, d∗} [d(B, 1→ 2) = d(B, 1→ 3) = d(B, 2→ 3) = d(B, 3→ 2) = 0]
d(B, 2→ 1) = d(B, 3→ 1) = 1
2
, d∗(B, 2→ 1) = d∗(B, 3→ 1) = 1
4
∀d ∈ {d, d, d∗} [d(B, 12→ 3) = d(B, 13→ 2) = 0]
d(B, 23→ 1) = d(B, 23→ 1) = d∗(B, 23→ 1) = 1
FB(1) = ∅, FB(2) = {2}, FB(3) = {3}
FB(12) = {1, 2}, FB(13) = {1, 3}, FB(23) = {1, 2, 3}
K(B) = {{2}, {3}}, B = B23→1
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Note that our influence function happens to be the canonical pure influential function of
the parents upon the child.
SUC1(gd, pB) = 1, SUC2(gd, pB) = SUC3(gd, pB) =
5
6
FAIL1(gd, pB) = 0, FAIL2(gd, pB) = FAIL3(gd, pB) =
1
6
DEC1(gd, pB) =
1
3
, DEC2(gd, pB) = DEC3(gd, pB) =
1
6
LUCK1(gd, pB) = LUCK2(gd, pB) = LUCK3(gd, pB) =
2
3
φ1(B, gd, p) = 1, φ2(B, gd, p) = φ3(B, gd, p) =
2
3
7 Conclusions
The improvement brought in this paper emphasizes the role of the influence function
in the Hoede-Bakker index. The global form of the index proposed here fully takes into
account the mutual influence among players. In particular, we define the possibility in-
fluence index which takes into account any possibility of influence, and the certainty
influence index which expresses certainty of influence. These indices are special cases of
the weighted influence index. To the best of our knowledge, such influence indices have
not been proposed before, and seem to be a very useful tool, in particular, in the theory
of coalition and alliance formation, negotiations, and more generally multi-agent systems.
There are still several other improvements we would like to bring to this framework in
the future research. One of the new research lines may be to introduce dynamic aspects.
The framework analyzed here is, in fact, a decision process after a single step of mutual
influence. In reality, the mutual influence does not stop necessarily after one step but may
iterate. We propose to study the behavior of the series Bi,B2i, ..., Bni; to find convergence
conditions, and to study the corresponding decisional power index.
Another natural improvement would be to enlarge the set of possible decisions. The
original framework considers only a yes-no decision in a voting situation. One may enlarge
this to a yes-no-abstention scheme (ternary voting games, [7]) or, if one escapes from
voting situations, to multi-choice games [12], where each player has a totally ordered set
of possible actions, and more generally to games on product lattices [9].
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